NAME

setpriv - run a program with different Linux privilege settings

SYNOPSIS

setpriv [options] program [arguments]

DESCRIPTION

Sets or queries various Linux privilege settings that are inherited across execve(2).

In comparison to su(1) and runuser(1), setpriv(1) neither uses PAM, nor does it prompt for a password. It is a simple, non-set-user-ID wrapper around execve(2), and can be used to drop privileges in the same way as setuidgid(8) from daemontools, chpst(8) from runit, or similar tools shipped by other service managers.

OPTION

--clear-groups

Clear supplementary groups.

-d, --dump

Dump current privilege state. Can be specified more than once to show extra, mostly useless, information. Incompatible with all other options.

--groups group...

Set supplementary groups. The argument is a comma-separated list of GIDs or names.

--inh-caps (+|-)cap... or --ambient-caps (+|-)cap... or --bounding-set (+|-)cap...

Set the inheritable capabilities, ambient capabilities or the capability bounding set. See **capabilities**(7). The argument is a comma-separated list of +cap and -cap entries, which add or remove an entry respectively. *cap* can either be a human-readable name as seen in **capabilities**(7) without the *cap*_ prefix or of the format **cap_N**, where N is the internal capability index used by Linux. +**all** and -**all** can be used to add or remove all caps. The set of capabilities starts out as the current inheritable set for --inh-caps, the current ambient set for --ambient-caps and the current bounding set for --bounding-set. If you drop something from the bounding set without also dropping it from the inheritable set, you are likely to become confused. Do not do that.

--keep-groups

Preserve supplementary groups. Only useful in conjunction with --rgid, --egid, or --regid.

--init-groups

Initialize supplementary groups using **initgroups**(3). Only useful in conjunction with **--ruid** or **--reuid**.

--list-caps

List all known capabilities. This option must be specified alone.

--no-new-privs

Set the *no_new_privs* bit. With this bit set, **execve**(2) will not grant new privileges. For example, the set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits as well as file capabilities will be disabled. (Executing binaries with these bits set will still work, but they will not gain privileges. Certain LSMs, especially AppArmor, may result in failures to execute certain programs.) This bit is inherited by child processes and cannot be unset. See **prctl**(2) and *Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt* in the Linux kernel source.

The no_new_privs bit is supported since Linux 3.5.

--rgid gid, --egid gid, --regid gid

Set the real, effective, or both GIDs. The *gid* argument can be given as textual group name.

For safety, you must specify one of **--clear-groups**, **--groups**, **--keep-groups**, or **--init-groups** if you set any primary *gid*.

--ruid uid, --euid uid, --reuid uid

Set the real, effective, or both UIDs. The *uid* argument can be given as textual login name.

Setting a *uid* or *gid* does not change capabilities, although the exec call at the end might change capabilities. This means that, if you are root, you probably want to do something like:

setpriv --reuid=1000 --regid=1000 --inh-caps=-all

--securebits (+|-)securebit...

Set or clear securebits. The argument is a comma-separated list. The valid securebits are *noroot*, *noroot_locked*, *no_setuid_fixup*, *no_setuid_fixup_locked*, and *keep_caps_locked*. *keep_caps* is cleared by **execve**(2) and is therefore not allowed.

--pdeathsig keep|clear|<signal>

Keep, clear or set the parent death signal. Some LSMs, most notably SELinux and AppArmor, clear the signal when the process' credentials change. Using **--pdeathsig keep** will restore the parent death signal after changing credentials to remedy that situation.

--selinux-label label

Request a particular SELinux transition (using a transition on exec, not dyntrans). This will fail and cause **setpriv**(1) to abort if SELinux is not in use, and the transition may be ignored or cause **execve**(2) to fail at SELinux's whim. (In particular, this is unlikely to work in conjunction with no_new_privs .) This is similar to **runcon**(1).

--apparmor-profile profile

Request a particular AppArmor profile (using a transition on exec). This will fail and cause setpriv(1) to abort if AppArmor is not in use, and the transition may be ignored or cause execve(2) to fail at AppArmor's whim.

--reset-env

Clears all the environment variables except TERM; initializes the environment variables HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME according to the user's passwd entry; sets PATH to */usr/lo-cal/bin:/bin:/usr/bin* for a regual user and to */usr/local/sbin:/usr/lo-cal/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/bin* for root.

The environment variable PATH may be different on systems where /bin and /sbin are merged into /usr. The environment variable SHELL defaults to /bin/sh if none is given in the user's passwd entry.

-V, --version

Display version information and exit.

-h, --help

Display help text and exit.

NOTES

If applying any specified option fails, *program* will not be run and **setpriv** will return with exit code 127.

Be careful with this tool -- it may have unexpected security consequences. For example, setting no_new_privs and then execing a program that is SELinux-confined (as this tool would do) may prevent the SELinux restrictions from taking effect.

EXAMPLE

If you're looking for behaviour similar to su(1)/runuser(1), or sudo(8) (without the -g option), try something like:

setpriv --reuid=1000 --regid=1000 --init-groups

If you want to mimic daemontools' **setuid**(8), try:

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setpriv --reuid=1000 --regid=1000 --clear-groups
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SEE ALSO

runuser(1), su(1), prctl(2), capabilities(7)

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AVAILABILITY

The **setpriv** command is part of the util-linux package and is available from Linux Kernel Archive (https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/).