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## ***Red Hat Enterprise Linux Release 9.2 Manual Pages on 'sd-stub.7' command***

**\$ man sd-stub.7**

SYSTEMD-STUB(7)            systemd-stub            SYSTEMD-STUB(7)

### NAME

systemd-stub, sd-stub, linuxx64.efi.stub, linuxia32.efi.stub,  
linuxaa64.efi.stub - A simple UEFI kernel boot stub

### SYNOPSIS

/usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/linuxx64.efi.stub  
/usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/linuxia32.efi.stub  
/usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/linuxaa64.efi.stub  
ESP/.../foo.efi.extra.d/\*.cred  
ESP/.../foo.efi.extra.d/\*.raw  
ESP/loader/credentials/\*.cred

### DESCRIPTION

systemd-stub (stored in per-architecture files linuxx64.efi.stub, linuxia32.efi.stub, linuxaa64.efi.stub on disk) is a simple UEFI boot stub. An UEFI boot stub is attached to a Linux kernel binary image, and is a piece of code that runs in the UEFI firmware environment before transitioning into the Linux kernel environment. The UEFI boot stub ensures a Linux kernel is executable as regular UEFI binary, and is able to do various preparations before switching the system into the Linux world.

The UEFI boot stub looks for various resources for the kernel invocation inside the UEFI PE binary itself. This allows combining various resources inside a single PE binary image (usually called

"Unified Kernel Image", or "UKI" for short), which may then be signed via UEFI SecureBoot as a whole, covering all individual resources at once. Specifically it may include:

- ? The ELF Linux kernel images will be looked for in the ".linux" PE section of the executed image.
- ? OS release information, i.e. the os-release(5) file of the OS the kernel belongs to, in the ".osrel" PE section.
- ? The initrd will be loaded from the ".initrd" PE section.
- ? A compiled binary DeviceTree will be looked for in the ".dtb" PE section.
- ? The kernel command line to pass to the invoked kernel will be looked for in the ".cmdline" PE section.
- ? A boot splash (in Windows .BMP format) to show on screen before invoking the kernel will be looked for in the ".splash" PE section.
- ? A set of cryptographic signatures for expected TPM2 PCR values when this kernel is booted, in JSON format, in the ".pcrsig" section.  
This is useful for implementing TPM2 policies that bind disk encryption and similar to kernels that are signed by a specific key.
- ? A public key in PEM format matching this TPM2 PCR signature data in the ".pcrpkey" section.

If UEFI SecureBoot is enabled and the ".cmdline" section is present in the executed image, any attempts to override the kernel command line by passing one as invocation parameters to the EFI binary are ignored. Thus, in order to allow overriding the kernel command line, either disable UEFI SecureBoot, or don't include a kernel command line PE section in the kernel image file. If a command line is accepted via EFI invocation parameters to the EFI binary it is measured into TPM PCR 12 (if a TPM is present).

If a DeviceTree is embedded in the ".dtb" section, it replaces an existing DeviceTree in the corresponding EFI configuration table.

systemd-stub will ask the firmware via the "EFI\_DT\_FIXUP\_PROTOCOL" for hardware specific fixups to the DeviceTree.

The contents of seven of these eight PE sections are measured into TPM PCR 11, that is otherwise not used. Thus, it can be pre-calculated without too much effort. The ".pcrsig" section is not included in this PCR measurement, since it's supposed to contain signatures for the expected results for these measurements, i.e. of the outputs of the measurement operation, and thus cannot also be input to it.

When ".pcrsig" and/or ".pcrpkey" are present in a unified kernel image their contents are passed to the booted kernel in an synthetic initrd cpio archive that places them in the `/.extra/tpm2-pcr-signature.json` and `/.extra/tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem` files. Typically, a `tmpfiles.d(5)` line then ensures they are copied into `/run/systemd/tpm2-pcr-signature.json` and `/run/systemd/tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem` where they remain accessible even after the system transitions out of the initrd environment into the host file system. Tools such `systemd-cryptsetup@.service(8)`, `systemd-cryptenroll(1)` and `systemd-creds(1)` will automatically use files present under these paths to unlock protected resources (encrypted storage or credentials) or bind encryption to booted kernels.

## COMPANION FILES

The `systemd-stub` UEFI boot stub automatically collects two types of auxiliary companion files optionally placed in drop-in directories on the same partition as the EFI binary, dynamically generates cpio initrd archives from them, and passes them to the kernel. Specifically:

? For a kernel binary called `foo.efi`, it will look for files with the `.cred` suffix in a directory named `foo.efi.extra.d/` next to it. A cpio archive is generated from all files found that way, placing them in the `/.extra/credentials/` directory of the initrd file hierarchy. The main initrd may then access them in this directory. This is supposed to be used to store auxiliary, encrypted, authenticated credentials for use with `LoadCredentialEncrypted=` in the UEFI System Partition. See `systemd.exec(5)` and `systemd-creds(1)` for details on encrypted credentials. The generated cpio archive is measured into TPM PCR 12 (if a TPM is present).

? Similarly, files `foo.efi.extra.d/*.raw` are packed up in a cpio archive and placed in the `./extra/sysextd/` directory in the `initrd` file hierarchy. This is supposed to be used to pass additional system extension images to the `initrd`. See `systemd-sysextd(8)` for details on system extension images. The generated cpio archive containing these system extension images is measured into TPM PCR 13 (if a TPM is present).

? Files `/loader/credentials/*.cred` are packed up in a cpio archive and placed in the `./extra/global_credentials/` directory of the `initrd` file hierarchy. This is supposed to be used to pass additional credentials to the `initrd`, regardless of the kernel being booted. The generated cpio archive is measured into TPM PCR 12 (if a TPM is present)

These mechanisms may be used to parameterize and extend trusted (i.e. signed), immutable `initrd` images in a reasonably safe way: all data they contain is measured into TPM PCRs. On access they should be further validated: in case of the credentials case by encrypting/authenticating them via TPM, as exposed by `systemd-creds encrypt -T` (see `systemd-creds(1)` for details); in case of the system extension images by using signed Verity images.

## TPM PCR NOTES

Note that when a unified kernel using `systemd-stub` is invoked the firmware will measure it as a whole to TPM PCR 4, covering all embedded resources, such as the stub code itself, the core kernel, the embedded `initrd` and kernel command line (see above for a full list).

Also note that the Linux kernel will measure all `initrds` it receives into TPM PCR 9. This means every type of `initrd` will be measured two or three times: the `initrd` embedded in the kernel image will be measured to PCR 4, PCR 9 and PCR 11; the `initrd` synthesized from credentials will be measured to both PCR 9 and PCR 12; the `initrd` synthesized from system extensions will be measured to both PCR 4 and PCR 9. Let's summarize the OS resources and the PCRs they are measured to:

Table 1. OS Resource PCR Summary

??

?OS Resource ? Measurement PCR ?

??

?systemd-stub code (the ? 4 ?

?entry point of the unified ?

?PE binary) ?

??

?Core kernel code (embedded ? 4 + 11 ?

?in unified PE binary) ?

??

?OS release information ? 4 + 11 ?

?(embedded in the unified ?

?PE binary) ?

??

?Main initrd (embedded in ? 4 + 9 + 11 ?

?unified PE binary) ?

??

?Default kernel command ? 4 + 11 ?

?line (embedded in unified ?

?PE binary) ?

??

?Overridden kernel command ? 12 ?

?line ?

??

?Boot splash (embedded in ? 4 + 11 ?

?the unified PE binary) ?

??

?TPM2 PCR signature JSON ? 4 + 9 ?

?(embedded in unified PE ?

?binary, synthesized into ?

?initrd) ?

??

?TPM2 PCR PEM public key ? 4 + 9 + 11 ?

?(embedded in unified PE ? ?  
 ?binary, synthesized into ? ?  
 ?initrd) ? ?  
 ???  
 ?Credentials (synthesized ? 9 + 12 ?  
 ?initrd from companion ? ?  
 ?files) ? ?  
 ???  
 ?System Extensions ? 9 + 13 ?  
 ?(synthesized initrd from ? ?  
 ?companion files) ? ?  
 ???

EFI VARIABLES

The following EFI variables are defined, set and read by systemd-stub, under the vendor UUID "4a67b082-0a4c-41cf-b6c7-440b29bb8c4f", for communication between the boot stub and the OS:

LoaderDevicePartUUID

Contains the partition UUID of the EFI System Partition the EFI image was run from. systemd-gpt-auto-generator(8) uses this information to automatically find the disk booted from, in order to discover various other partitions on the same disk automatically.

LoaderFirmwareInfo, LoaderFirmwareType

Brief firmware information. Use bootctl(1) to view this data.

LoaderImageIdentifier

The path of EFI executable, relative to the EFI System Partition's root directory. Use bootctl(1) to view this data.

StubInfo

Brief stub information. Use bootctl(1) to view this data.

StubPcrKernellImage

The PCR register index the kernel image, initrd image, boot splash, devicetree database, and the embedded command line are measured into, formatted as decimal ASCII string (e.g. "11"). This variable is set if a measurement was successfully completed, and remains

unset otherwise.

#### StubPcrKernelParameters

The PCR register index the kernel command line and credentials are measured into, formatted as decimal ASCII string (e.g. "12"). This variable is set if a measurement was successfully completed, and remains unset otherwise.

#### StubPcrInitRDSysExts

The PCR register index the systemd extensions for the initrd, which are picked up from the file system the kernel image is located on. Formatted as decimal ASCII string (e.g. "13"). This variable is set if a measurement was successfully completed, and remains unset otherwise.

Note that some of the variables above may also be set by the boot loader. The stub will only set them if they aren't set already. Some of these variables are defined by the Boot Loader Interface[1].

## INITRD RESOURCES

The following resources are passed as initrd cpio archives to the booted kernel, and thus make up the initial file system hierarchy in the initrd execution environment:

/

The main initrd from the ".initrd" PE section of the unified kernel image.

`/.extra/credentials/*.cred`

Credential files (suffix ".cred") that are placed next to the unified kernel image (as described above) are copied into the `/.extra/credentials/` directory in the initrd execution environment.

`/.extra/global_credentials/*.cred`

Similar, credential files in the `/loader/credentials/` directory in the file system the unified kernel image is placed in are copied into the `/.extra/global_credentials/` directory in the initrd execution environment.

`/.extra/sysext/*.raw`

System extension image files (suffix ".raw") that are placed next

to the unified kernel image (as described above) are copied into the `./extra/sysextr/` directory in the `initrd` execution environment.

`./extra/tpm2-pcr-signature.json`

The TPM2 PCR signature JSON object included in the `".pcrsig"` PE section of the unified kernel image is copied into the `./extra/tpm2-pcr-signature.json` file in the `initrd` execution environment.

`./extra/tpm2-pcr-pkey.pem`

The PEM public key included in the `".pcrpkey"` PE section of the unified kernel image is copied into the `./extra/tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem` file in the `initrd` execution environment.

Note that all these files are located in the `"tmpfs"` file system the kernel sets up for the `initrd` file hierarchy and are thus lost when the system transitions from the `initrd` execution environment into the host file system. If these resources shall be kept around over this transition they need to be copied to a place that survives the transition first, for example via a suitable `tmpfiles.d(5)` line. By default, this is done for the TPM2 PCR signature and public key files.

## ASSEMBLING KERNEL IMAGES

In order to assemble an UEFI PE kernel image from various components as described above, use an `objcopy(1)` command line like this:

```
objcopy \  
  --add-section .osrel=os-release --change-section-vma .osrel=0x20000 \  
  --add-section .cmdline=cmdline.txt --change-section-vma .cmdline=0x30000 \  
  --add-section .dtb=devicetree.dtb --change-section-vma .dtb=0x40000 \  
  --add-section .splash=splash.bmp --change-section-vma .splash=0x100000 \  
  --add-section .linux=vmlinux --change-section-vma .linux=0x2000000 \  
  --add-section .initrd=initrd.cpio --change-section-vma .initrd=0x3000000 \  
  /usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/linuxx64.efi.stub \  
  foo-unsigned.efi
```

Note that these PE section offsets are example values and a properly assembled image must not contain any overlapping sections (this



includes already existing sections inside the stub before assembly) or boot may fail.

This generates one PE executable file foo-unsigned.efi from the six individual files for OS release information, kernel command line, boot splash image, kernel image, main initrd and UEFI boot stub.

To then sign the resulting image for UEFI SecureBoot use an sbsign(1) command like the following:

```
sbsign \  
  --key mykey.pem \  
  --cert mykey.crt \  
  --output foo.efi \  
  foo-unsigned.efi
```

This expects a pair of X.509 private key and certificate as parameters and then signs the UEFI PE executable we generated above for UEFI SecureBoot and generates a signed UEFI PE executable as result.

See systemd-measure(1) for an example involving the ".pcrsig" and ".pcrpkey" sections.

## SEE ALSO

systemd-boot(7), systemd.exec(5), systemd-creds(1), systemd-sysext(8),  
Boot Loader Specification[2], Boot Loader Interface[1], objcopy(1),  
sbsign(1), systemd-measure(1)

## NOTES

### 1. Boot Loader Interface

[https://systemd.io/BOOT\\_LOADER\\_INTERFACE](https://systemd.io/BOOT_LOADER_INTERFACE)

### 2. Boot Loader Specification

[https://systemd.io/BOOT\\_LOADER\\_SPECIFICATION](https://systemd.io/BOOT_LOADER_SPECIFICATION)

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